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THE RISE OF NEW CLASSICAL ECONOMICS1 
by Rudy van Zijp 
1. INTRODUCTION 
From the 1970s onwards the New Classical research programme attracted much attention 
among economists. lts assumptions and theoretical conclusions evoked much controversy, 
which resulted in an extensive literature on the methodology of the NCE. The earliest 
analysis has been that of Maddock (1979) and (1984), who depicted the development of 
the New Classical research programme and provided a reconstruction along Lakatosian 
lines. He argued that the initial goal of the 'Rational-Expectations theorists' was to test the 
Natural Rate Hypothesis. However, in the mid 1970s the programme experienced a pro-
blem shift towards the theory of economie policy, and more in particular towards the 
neutrality proposition. A second approach in the discussion of the New Classical methodol-
ogy is that of Klamer (1984), who concentrated on the style of argument (rhetorics) of the 
NCE. He also opined that the central claim of this programme is the neutrality proposi-
tion. Anticipated changes in the money supply will not affect real output and unemploy-
ment. It thus appears that in this regard he concurs with Maddock. Boland's (1986) critical 
analysis of the so-called disequilibrium foundation of equilibrium economics is the third 
discussion of the NCE, although its object is not restricted to this research programme. 
However, nis criticisms of what he called Macroeconomics, Rational Expectations, 
Stochasticism, and Instrumentalism directly apply to the NCE. This also applies to his 
criticisms of the assumption of continuously clearing markets. A fourth analysis of the 
NCE was provided by Hoover (1988), who made a comparison between Friedman's and 
the New Classical methodology. He concentrated on the former's partial and the latter's 
general equilibrium analysis, and concluded that Friedman's economics is Marshallian in 
nature, whereas the NCE is a Walrasian type of monetarism. Hoover's analysis was 
criticized by Hirsch and De Marchi (1990). The latest contribution has been that of De 
Marchi (1990). He makes clear that Maddock's appraisal of Lucas's 'Expectations and the 
neutrality of money" (1972a) is incorrect, because it was written at a much earlier date 
than Maddock assumed. According to De Marchi (1990), it was written in 1970, which 
means that it should be interpreted as 'defining' the positive and negative heuristic of the 
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CE. That is, it set the modelling style. 
Given the propensity of economists and economie methodologists to differ of 
opinion, one might expect that the various studies of the emergence and development of 
New Classicism would inevitably lead to differences concerning the central claims of this 
research programme. However, there has been a remarkable agreement on these claims, 
although emphasis differs. Given this large degree of agreement, the conclusion seems 
justified that there is a consensus as regards the solution of the problem of definition (or 
classification) of the NCE. The NCE can be defined as a scientific research programme 
which incorporates the following assumptions: 
(1) the assumption of continuous market clearing; 
(2) the Lucas supply function (including some version of the NRH); 
(3) some version of the Rational Expectations Hypothesis; and 
(4) some assumption about the information set of the individuals.2 
This paper will analyze what versions of these assumptions were used by the early contri-
butors to the programme. The analysis will be restricted to the work of Robert E. Lucas, 
Jr., Leonard A. Rapping, and Thomas J. Sargent. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the formalization of the 
Natural Rate Hypothesis (NRH) by Lucas and Rapping (1969a and 1969b). They adopted 
a partial-equiübrium model in which the concept of the 'representative individual' was 
incorporated. Such a framework is clearly incapable of analyzing economy-wide interde-
pendencies. Phelps (1970) opined that partial-equilibrium analysis could not be used to 
account for the negative slope of the Phillips Curve. He introduced instead the so-called 
'islands parable', which holds that an economy consists of markets which are imperfectly 
linked both physically and informationally. Moreover, Lucas and Rapping used the AEH, 
which is in danger of being inconsistent with the rationality postulate. This problem was 
solved by substituting the Rational Expectation Hypothesis (REH) for the AEH. The 
former will be discussed in section 3. The change from partial-equilibrium to general-
equilibrium framework is addressed in section 4. Section 5 subsequently discusses an 
econometrie issue which arose because of the substitution of the REH for the AEH. The 
REH implied that economie agents would include economie policy in their expectations. 
An anticipated change in policy then results in a change in expectations, and therefore in a 
change in behaviour. Lucas criticized 'orthodox* methods of pohcy evaluation because they 
neglected these behavioural changes. The exposition of the so-called 'Lucas critique' is 
foliowed in section 6 by a discussion of Lucas's attempt to test the NRH empirically. This 
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attempt evaded the issues concerning econometrie policy evaluation which Lucas himself 
had raised. In contrast, Sargent's empirical tests, which were performed at about the same 
time as that of Lucas, did take the Lucas's critique into account. Before discussing these 
tests, a short detour will be made by outlining their 'prehistory*. This discussion of 
Sargent's early work will make clear that Friedman's NRH amounts to the same thing as 
Fisher's long-term framework of nis solution to the Gibson paradox. Section 8 contains 
some conclusions. 
2. THE FORMALIZATION OF THE NRH 
The first step towards New Classical Macroeconomics was made by Lucas and Rapping 
(1969a).3 They attëmpted to provide "... the rationalization in supply-and-demand terms of 
the observed correlation between unemployment rates and rates of inflation, or Phillips 
curve" (p. 20).4 Friedman's and Schwartz' (1963 (1969)) 'tentative sketch' had already 
given this rationalization in verbal terms. Moreover, Phelps (1967) had shown that the 
Adaptive Expectations Hypothesis could be used as the transition mechanism from the 
short-term to the long-term Phillips Curve. However, he had not been able to include both 
types of curves in his mathematical model. Lucas and Rapping (1969a) tried to solve this 
problem by formalizing the NRU in such a way as to allow for short-term deviations from 
this rate. In their view, "... an adequate model must contain both a short run and a long 
run. There are, then, three features which we feel a model of the labor market (or, more 
broadly, the production-employment sector) should possess. First, it should incorporate the 
neoclassical feature that for fixed capital stock the aggregate supply schedule (relating the 
price of goods to real output) will become perfectly inelastic over a long period of stable 
aggregate demand. Second, the model should imply an elastic short-run aggregate supply 
function consistent with the observed fluctuations in real output and employment in the 
face of shifting aggregate demand. Finally, the transition from short-run to long-run 
market equilibrium should be described in full" (pp. 20-21). In other words, the vertical 
long-run Phillips Curve (i.e. the NRH) was accepted as the relevant framework in which to 
model the short-run Phillips Curve. The model which they used was a partial-equilibrium, 
3
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 They were clearly dissatisfied by "[rjecent attempts to give a theoretical base to the 
Phillips curve [which] have been based largely on a view of the labor market as dominated 
by collective bargaining, where bargaining outcomes bear no explicit relation to supply-
and-demand for ces" (p. 20). 
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perfect-competition model of the labour market. lts most important aspect is the aggregate 
supply function, which has also become known as the Lucas supply function? This 
function describes long-term as well as short-term output relations. As Lucas's and 
Rapping's labour demand function is a fairly straightforward application of the marginal 
productivity theory, the discussion here will concentrate on their supply function.6 
Lucas and Rapping (1969a, p. 24) formulated their theory of the supply of labour 
in terms of the choice between goods and leisure, facing a single household (or individual) 
in a competitive market. The household's supply of labour was assumed to depend on 
current nominal wages, current prices, the present value of future real wages, the present 
value of future prices, the real rate of interest, and initial asset holdings (non-human 
wealth). By assuming homogeneity of degree zero in all arguments Lucas and Rapping 
subsequently deflated the nominal variables by current prices. The formulation of the 
household's supply function of labour reflects that it must not only choose between current 
goods and current leisure, but also between current labour supply and future labour 
supply. This means that there can be substitution between present labour supply and leisu-
re, and between present and future labour supply. 
An important step in Lucas's and Rapping's (1969a) analysis was to interpret the 
household as a representative household? In this manner the household's supply of labour 
could be transformed into an aggregate supply of labour. But this procedure also entails an 
important narrowing of the problems which can be analyzed. By using the concept of the 
representative household Lucas and Rapping implicitly assumed that all individuals belong 
to the same 'class' and face similar optimization problems (which do not differ from each 
-* Lucas (1981a, p. 5) himself gave credit to Rapping by stating that its proper name 
should have been the Lucas-Rapping supply function. In the literature on the New 
Classical Economics, however, it is called the Lucas supply curve. For several versions of 
this curve, see Minford and Peel (1981). 
6
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other in relevant aspects). The concept is a hypostatisation in the sense that it treats 
aggregates and index numbers as if they obey the principles of microeconomics. It is 
implicitly defined as the mathematical mean of the group (or subsystem) as a whole. In 
turn, this means that it does not allow for distributional effects. This emphasis on aggre-
gates disregards their composition and its changes. The effects of redistributions between 
economie agents fall outside the scope of analysis. Furthennore, the problem of how 
coordination is brought about cannot be analyzed. Lucas and Rapping (1969a, p. 21) solved 
(or rather circumvented) this problem by assuming competitive labour markets in which a 
"Walrasian auctioneer' ensures that equilibrium will prevail. 
The Lucas supply function which was used by Lucas and Rapping (1969a) assu-
med that the aggregate labour supply depends on the current real wage rate (wt), the 
anticipated real wage rate based on information available at time t (w,*), the nominal wage 
rate (rt), and the deflated market value of initial non-human wealth (a,).8 In contrast to 
Friedman (1957), Lucas and Rapping (1969a) eliminated the latter (wealth) effect from 
their labour supply function. On empirical grounds they considered it to be small.9 In 
other words, only changes in prices and wages are presumed to cause fluctuations in 
unemployment. 
Following Friedman's (1957) Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH), Lucas and 
Rapping (1969a, p. 26) interpreted the (current and expected) real wage rate as consisting 
of two components, namely a permanent and a transitory one. The representative house-
hold bases its labour-supply decision on some notion of its 'normal' real wage rate.10 
Lucas and Rapping (1969a, p. 26) stated this labour supply function in mathematical 
form as: 
In (NJM) = p0 + P, In (w,) - §2 In (w,*) + p3[r, - In (Pt'fP)] - P4 In {aJM) 
where Nt is the aggregate labour supply in total man-hours per year in period t, and Mt is 
an index of the number of households in the same period. The other symbols represent the 
variables as explicated in the text. As is argued below, Lucas and Rapping excluded the 
wealth component (i.e., they assumed that /34 = 0). 
9
 Lucas and Rapping (1969a, p. 50nl2) admitted that the available evidence is not 
unanimous in this regard. When reflecting on his 1969a paper with Rapping, Lucas (1981a, 
p. 3) also gave a theoretical reason for excluding the asset effect. He argued that reduced 
employment caused by wealth increases is perceived as a positive phenomenon, whereas 
reduced employment in depressions are seen as negative phenomena. This means that a 
fall in the supply of labour which is induced by a rise in wealth cannot constitute cyclical 
unemployment. 
10
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This rate is 'measured' by the wage-rate expectation of the representative household, wt*. 
Given the fact that this household is defined as the mathematica! mean of the system as a 
whole, this means that the economy-wide permanent or 'nonnal' real wage rate is identical 
to the expected real wage rate. The transitory component indicates the degree in which the 
current real wage rate differs from the permanent rate (wt - H>,*). If the former is higher 
than the latter, then the supply of labour will be increased, because the households will 
intertemporally substitute their labour activities. Of course, the reverse also applies. 
The transitory component in the real wage rate and in the general price level, 
and hence the cyclical changes in the supply of labour, can only be determined if the 
permanent component is known. The latter is reflected in the household's expectation, and 
hence an assumption about the household's expectations formation mechanism is required. 
Lucas and Rapping (1969a, pp. 27 - 28) adopted the Adaptive Expectations Hypothesis 
(AEH). It enabled them to reformulate their labour supply function into an unemploy-
ment-rate function, which expresses deviations from the permanent (or 'nonnal') rate of 
unemployment in terms of deviations from the permanent real wage rate and permanent 
price level.11 This implies some sort of money illusion on the part of the economie agents. 
After all, a change in the general price level would lead to a change the unemployment 
rate. This property follows from the assumption that the agents form their expectations 
adaptively. Given the AEH, the NRH will only hold in the long run. 
The analysis of Lucas and Rapping (1969a), and more in particular their version 
of the AEH and the consequent money illusion, is in danger of being inconsistent with the 
rationality postulate. In a second article, which was published in 1969, they acknowledged 
that their version of the AEH was based on "... an unreasonable stubbornness on the part 
of the households: if a sustained infiationary policy is pursued by the governments [i.e. if 
the rate of inflation continues to increase], households following the adaptive rule will 
continue f orever to underpredict future prices" (p. 344, italics in original). They changed it 
by choosing a lag structure which fitted their data best. Thus, this new lag structure was 
not imposed on a priori grounds, but instead was inductively derived (cf. Maddock (1979, p. 
198)), and could therefore be called 'ad hoc'. 
Lucas and Rapping (1969a and 1969b) had thus formalized the idea of Friedman 
(1968) and Phelps (1967) that the negatively sloped Phillips Curve reflects short-term 
expectational enors. In the long run expectations will be correct, thus making the long-
11
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term Phillips Curve vertical. Furthermore, their empirical tests had indicated that "... 
statistical Phillips curves are highly unstable over time, and this instability is far too serious 
to be dismissed by a vacuous reference to structural change ..." (1969b, p. 349). They 
concluded that the curves "... are a weak foundation on which to base policy decisions" (p. 
349), thus dismissing the Samuelson-Solow suggestion that the curves reflect exploitable 
trade-offs. This constituted a formidable attack on 'orthodox' stabilization policy. However, 
their results were not generally accepted. 
Lucas's and Rapping's analysis was criticized on several accounts. Firstly, Rees 
(1970) criticized their assumption that labour markets continuously clear. He argued that 
economie agents will only withdraw their labour supply if they expect the current real wage 
rate to be temporarily below its 'normal' level. However, he did not ascribe such views to 
the unemployed during a prolonged depression, such as the Great Depression in the 1930s. 
He rejected the model's implication that"... unemployment arises from the recaldtrance of 
suppliers and not from deficiënties in aggregate demand" (p. 309).12 In a reply Lucas and 
Rapping (1972, p. 60) argued that in their 1969b model real GNP does influence unem-
ployment. They acknowledged that it does not enter in the unemployment rate function, 
but as this function is one of three structural equations in a three-equation system, it is 
also necessary to take the other equations into account. It then becomes clear that 
unemployment is a function of real wages, and that real wages are a function of real GNP 
per household.13 In turn, they concluded, unemployment is also determined by real GNP. 
But when they concentrated on the effect of lagged unemployment on actual unemploy-
ment, it turned out that for the period 1930 - 1945 the persistence could not be fully 
explained by price expectations behaviour.14 Thus Lucas's and Rapping's (1972) model was 
12
 Rees (1970, p. 309) also pointed out that Lucas's and Rapping's use of the term 
'Phillips curve' is somewhat misleading. Phillips had assumed that the direction of 
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drift proceeded at so slow a pace." 
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confronted with an anomaly. In his 1973 test Lucas would circumvent this anomaly by 
incorporating lagged income as an explanatory variable in the aggregate supply curve.16 
The second problem which arose from Lucas and Rapping (1969b) concerns the 
framework in which they had conducted their analyses. As they themselves already 
acknowledged, their models were partial-equilibrium models, which means that the general 
interdependencies in the economy were disregarded. In his later work Lucas would solve 
this problem by adopting Phelps's (1970) 'islands parable'.17 
Thirdly, Lucas and Rapping had used the AEH, which (even in its inductively 
improved version) remained unsatisfactory from a theoretical point of view because it is in 
danger of being inconsistent with the rationality postulate. Therefore, Lucas would 
substitute it by Muth's (1961) Rational Expectations Hypothesis (REH). However, the 
adoption of Phelps's parable would change the content of the REH. In time it would lead 
to Lucas's critique of Standard methods of econometrie policy evaluation. 
3. THE RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS HYPOTHESIS 
Presumably the best-known characteristic of New Classical analysis is the Rational Expecta-
tions Hypothesis (REH). Muth (1961, p. 315) had advanced the hypothesis that expectati-
ons are essentially the same as the predictions of the relevant economie theory. Or, as he 
formulated more exactly, "... expectations of firms (or, more generally, the subjective 
probability distributions of outcomes) tend to be distributed, for the same information set, 
Favourably interpreted in a Lakatosian scheme, the reply by Lucas and Rapping is 
theoretically progressive as it contained an implicit recognition of Sargent's 'observational 
equivalence'. It implicitly predicted that the data cannot determine whether the appropriate 
model is an equilibrium or a disequilibrium model. However, if any implicit prediction is 
not recognized as a real (unexpected) prediction, then the reply is merely a defensive reply 
to Rees's criticism, and hence theoretically degenerative in a Lakatosian sense. But it 
should be recognized that Lakatos's framework does not capture an important element of 
economics as a competitive and hence communicative process, namely its rhetorics 
(including its attacks on other research programmes). 
16
 The test itself will be discussed in more detail in section 6. 
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 Lucas (1981a, p. 6) opined that "[t]he best thing that happened to Rapping's and my 
[1969a] paper was that Edmund Phelps came across it and a number of related papers by 
others at a time when he himself was working on similar problems. ... Rapping and I had 
been thinking in sectoral terms typical of at least the more econometrically oriented 
macroeconomic tradition. We viewed ourselves as constructing a model of the 'wage-price 
sector', potentially suitable for combining with other models of other 'sectors' to provide a 
model of the entire economy. ... Phelps, as is evident from his introductory essay to the 
volume, was thinking in general-equilibrium terms ..." 
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about the prediction of the theory (or the 'objective' probability distributions of outcomes)" 
(p. 316). He argued that if economie theorists could predict better than the economie 
agents, they must have superior foreknowledge of the predicted outcome. But if they have, 
then the question arises why some entrepreneur does not study economics in order to sell 
his better predictions? After all, it would be rational for optimizing agents to use economie 
theory if this would lead to (higher) profits.18 By linking economie theory and economie 
practice, Muth took a modest stand for economists with regard to the predictive powers of 
their theories. However, if a theorist wants to obtain definite outcomes of the assumed 
expectations formation mechanism (as Muth did), then fae must specify a 'correct' model 
of the economy. Furthermore, he must make assumptions with regard to the content of the 
agents' information sets. Therefore, Muth (1961, p. 317) used ("[f]or purposes of analysis 
...") a 'specific form' of the REH in a partial-equilibrium analysis, in which he assumed 
that the random disturbances are normally distributed. Individuals were also assumed to 
know these distributions, which means that on average their expectations are correct. That 
is, the expectations of the 'representative individual' are correct, and thus must be based 
on all relevant information. As will be shown in the next section, Lucas (1972a) transposed 
the REH to a general-equilibrium context, which has an important implication with regard 
to the individuals' information sets. This will be discussed in the next section, but first we 
must distinguish between types of REH. 
The general formulation of the REH leaves room for several interpretations. A 
taxonomy may be formulated which discerns a strong and a weak form of the REH.19 
Both forms assume different information sets. The strong form holds that the represen-
tative individual knows at least (i) the 'true' structure of the model economy, (ii) the 'true' 
values of the parameters in that economy, and (iii) the past values of the relevant vari-
ables.20 Stated differently, the strong form holds that individual expectations (taken separa-
In McCloskey's (1985, p. 88) words, "[t]he claim to know how economie actors 
predict ... runs up against the American Question ...: If you're so smart, why ain't you 
rich?" 
19
 The strong form can be divided into three version, namely the descriptive, the 
micro-instrumentalist, and the macro-instrumentalist version. For an explication of the 
respective assumption about the agents' information sets, see Snippe (1986 - 87). 
20
 Cf. Grossman (1980, p. 10). Runde and Torr (1985, p. 220) argued that the use of 
the concept of the 'representative individual' means that possible differences between 
individuals are disregarded. These differences may concern (1) their abilities to gather and 
process information, and/or (2) their forecast functions. Some individuals may not be able 
to gather and process information as efficiently as others, or (given their information) they 
may not be able to predict as accurately as others. Under these circumstances, there seems 
9 
tely) may be incorrect, but that they are correct in the aggregate. The expectational errors 
are supposed to cancel out, presumably due to the 'Law of Large Numbers'.21 As Muth 
(1961, p. 316 - 17) assumed that in the aggregate individuals do not make larger expectati-
onal errors than economie theory, his version of the REH may best be represented as a 
strong form. The weak form of the REH is merely a restatement of the rationality 
postulate. Individuals are assumed to optimize the infonnation on which they base their 
decisions. Obviously, if infonnation is not costless, the optimal infonnation need not be 
sufficiënt to lead to Muth-rational ('correct') expectations. Moreover, the weak form may 
suffer from an indeterminacy, as it may not be possible to determine the optimal 'amount' 
of infonnation. Infonnation optimization presupposes expectations about its marginal 
returns and costs. However, expectations (being informed predictions) already presuppose 
infonnation. In other words, expectations are needed in order to optimize infonnation, 
while infonnation is needed to form expectations. This may appear to be a problem of 
circularity, but it is not. It is a problem of infinite regress, because the infonnation needed 
for expectations formation is of a different kind than the infonnation for which the 
expectations are needed. Therefore optimizing information involves infinite regress, leaving 
the optimality of the information gathered by the individuals unexplained and hence 
undetermined. This can also be phrased in terms of the Shackle-Boulding paradox, which 
to be no reason to presume why these errors should cancel out. The New Classical models 
under consideration do not allow individuals to have such different abilities and/or functi-
ons, because their analysis exclusively deals with the 'representative individual'. Stated 
differently, New Classicals presume that individuals belong to the same class, in the sense 
that they do not differ from each other in any relevant aspect. 
21
 Haltiwanger and Waldman (1989, p. 620) emphasize that a situation in which 
expectations are rational in the aggregate (because deviations from the average expectation 
cancel out) may differ from the situation in which all individuals hold rational expectations 
(i.e. in which there are no deviations from the mathematica! mean). The difference 
between the respective rational expectations equilibria (REE, see below) depends on the 
nature of interaction between economie agents. They identify two types of interaction, 
namely 'congestion' and 'synergism'. The former is defined as the situation in which the 
larger the number of participants in a given activity, the lower is the incentive to partici-
pate (e.g. career choice). Synergism is defined as the opposite situation, in which the larger 
the number of participants, the higher the incentive to participate (e.g. the choice which 
currency to use in international trade). They concluded that "[o]nly under very special 
condition do Standard [i.e. individual] rational expectations and aggregate rational 
expectations yield equivalent results. The difference between the two equilibria is larger 
when: (i) the divergence in expectations under aggregate rational expectations is increased; 
(ii) in a world which exhibits congestion, the severity of the congestion is decreased; (iii) in 
a world which exhibits synergism, the severity of the synergism is increased; and (iv) the 
activities exhibit synergism rather than congestion" (p. 631). New Classicals disregard these 
interactional effects by restricting their analyses to the representative individual. 
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holds that any planned (rational) knowledge acquisition process presupposes undeliberately 
acquired knowledge.22 Hence the economics of information, as originated by Stigler (1961), 
fails to make clear how the marginal benefits of information can be equated with the 
marginal costs. In this sense the REH presupposes the existence of non-deliberate search 
procedures which it cannot explain. At the same time, and despite this drawback, it also 
appears to be the most sophisticated and least ad-hoc formalization of an expectations 
formation mechanism. 
The content of rational expectations crucially depends on the model in which the 
REH is incorporated. The hypothesis cannot stand on its own, because otherwise it cannot 
be asserted which expectations are rational. It must therefore be analyzed in a model.23 
Muth's (1961) model had been a partial-equilibrium model, and so were those of Lucas 
and Rapping (1969a and 1969b). In two subsequent papers Lucas adopted a general-equi-
librium framework, and more in particular, Phelps's 'islands parable', instead.24 
22
 Cf. Shackle (1952 (1955), pp. 17 - 18), Boulding (1966, p. 146), and Kirzner (1976 
(1979), p. 142). The latter used the term 'Shackle-Boulding paradox*. 
23
 This led Buiter (1980, p. 38) to conclude that "[t]he hypothesis appears to be in 
danger of being consistent with any conceivable body of empirical evidence, because the 
assumption of optimal use of the available information cannot be tested independently of 
an assumption about the available information set." Buiter's irrefutability critique (as 
Kamath (1989, p. 222) labeled it) amounts to the view that the REH is irrefutable, and 
hence non-scientific in a Popperian sense. Stated differently, the REH may be considered 
to be a part of the New Classical hard core, whereas the information set underlying the 
expectations belongs to the protective belt. It should be noted that Buiter's critique presu-
mes that a single hypothesis can be tested. This runs counter to the Duhem-Quine thesis, 
which holds that only combinations of hypotheses can be tested, and that therefore crucial 
tests of isolated hypotheses cannot exist. This thesis seriously weakens Buiter's critique. 
24
 It should be noted (as De Marchi (1990) did) that the articles referred to were 
already written in 1970, although they have been published as late as 1972. Presumably the 
first, entitled 'Expectations and the neutrality of money^ was received by the Journal of 
Economie Theory on September 4, 1970, whereas the second, 'Econometrie testing of the 
Natural Rate Hypothesis', was presented at a conference on October 30-31, 1970. Given 
the years of publication, we shaU refer to them as Lucas (1972a) and (1972b) respectively. 
Although there is hardly any indication (except the dates mentioned) as to which paper 
was written first, the order given above will be maintained. The reason for this is a logical 
one. Lucas (1972a) tried to formalize Phelps's parable, using the REH, whereas in his 
(1972b) he addressed some (econometrie) difficulties in testing models which include this 
hypothesis. As model specification preceeds empirical testing, Lucas presumably formu-
lated the model before directing his attention towards the problems inherent in testing it. 
11 
4. FROM PARTIAL TO GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM 
In his 'Expectations and the neutrality of money^  (1972a, witten in 1970) Lucas tried to 
give "... a simple example of an economy in which equilibrium prices and quantities exhibit 
what may be the central feature of the modern business cycle: a systematic relation 
between the rate of change in nominal prices and the level of real output" (1972a, p. 
6Ö).25 In order to discuss this Phillips-Curve relationship he formulated a mathematica! 
model of an economy in which individuals do not have 'money illusion'. The rationality 
postulate is adopted as an a priori principle. Moreover, prices are assumed to be perfectly 
flexible and market-clearing, and individuals form their expectations according to the 
REH. In this setting the fluctuations in real output (and employment) must be attributed 
to the fact that individuals have incomplete information. Furthermore, Lucas (1972a) 
assumed that individuals are price-taking agents, which means that a single agent cannot 
influence (or rather, has an infinitely small effect on) the price on his market. This as-
sumption rules out any price-setting behaviour, which means that Lucas's model needed to 
specify a mechanism by means of which disequilibrium prices are changed into equilibrium 
(market-clearing) prices. He 'solved' this coordination problem by assuming that "[wjithin 
each market, trading by auction occurs, with all trades transacted at a single, market 
clearing price" (p. 68). The 'Walrasian auctioneer' thus ensured that all prices are com-
pletely flexible, and that all markets clear continuously. The resulting general equilibrium 
does not imply that the actions are ex-post optimal in some absolute sense. That is, it does 
not need to be a Natural Rate Equilibrium (NRE) which is characterized by perfect know-
ledge and perfect foresight. The actions may well prove to be ex-post non-optimal, because 
in the process of acting individuals have obtained new (better) knowledge. Such a general 
equilibrium concept is called a Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE).26 It merely holds 
that, given their information sets, individuals form (ex-ante) optimal (and rational) expec-
tations. 
Given the REH, the content of the expectations is determined by the informa-
tion which is contained in the individuals' information sets. Lucas (1972a, p. 68) postulated 
a two-period overlapping-generations model in which the individuals belonging to each new 
generation are stochastically distributed over two markets, with fraction 6/2 going to one 
25
 Page numbers refer to the 1981 reprint of Lucas (1972a). 
26
 According to Radner (1989, p. 317), the REE is characterized by the fact that 
individals learn from price changes. That is, in the REE individual decision-makers take 
account of 'the potential informational feedback of prices'. 
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and l-(ö/2) going to the other market. The allocation variable 6 is unknown, except 
indirectly via prices. After the distribution of agents over both markets, no communication 
is possible between the markets. There are three goods: labour, output, and money. 
Output is only produced by the young, and it cannot be stored. Neither output nor money 
can be inherited. In such a framework, exchange is only possible between the young and 
the old. The former sell their output against the money which the old have held over from 
the preceding period (p. 68). As in Phelps's parable, the agents must act on the basis of 
incomplete global and complete local information. Moreover, the former is lagged with 
one period. In short, information is heterogeneous across markets. As the agents are 
presumed to be identical (p. 68), information is homogeneous across agents on the same 
market. Money (m) is assumed to be the exogenous, primary variable. lts supply (mx = 
nt(fc, where mj applies to period 1 and m0 to period 0) changes at random. Like the 
changes in 6, the actual changes x are also indirectly known through changes in the general 
price level, although again this information will only become available in the next period. 
Both 6 and x are serially independent, which means that past deviations from their mean 
do not reveal any information as regards current and future deviations. Lucas (1972a, p. 
73) assumed that the individuals know the 'true' probability distributions of changes in the 
money supply, and of changes in the allocation of individuals over both markets. The 
agents thus know the 'true' distributions of monetary as well as real disturbances.27 
Moreover, as the global information of the previous period is known, agents also know m0 
(presuming that they form expectations about /MJ).28 In conclusion, "... the state of the 
economy in any period is entirely described by three variables m, x, and 6." That is, the 
price p can be expressed as a function of (m, x, 0). The dynamic behaviour of the economy 
as a whole can then be obtained by describing the successive constellations of these three 
'state variables'. The economie agents form their expectations on the known distributions 
of these variables. The state variables fluctuate at random, randomly disturbing p. The 
disturbances may have either a monetary or a real nature. The agents thus face a signal 
extraction problem: they must determine how much of a change in their local price must be 
attributed to real and how much to monetary disturbances. As global information is lagged 
2
 This is merely another way of stating that expectations are formed rationally in the 
sense of Muth (1961), as the latter's definition (which was given in section 3) reveals. 
28
 Lucas (1972a, p. 73) stated that "... the true probability distribution of next period's 
price, p' - p (m\ x', 6") = p (mr, x', 0') is known, conditional on m, from the known dis-
tributions of x, x', and 6'. Further information is also available to traders, however, since 
the current price, p (m, x, 8) yields information on x", where the variables with the apos-
trophe denote variables in period 1, and those without apostrophe apply to period 0. 
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one period, the agents are bound to make expectational errors. They will mistake 
monetarily-induced price changes for changes which result from real disturbances. As 
Lucas (1972a, p. 78) stated, "... monetary changes have real consequences only because 
people cannot discriminate perfectly between real and monetary demand shifts." Economie 
agents then merely behave as if they suffer from money illusion.29 However, Lucas (1972a, 
p. 79) continued by arguing that such expectational errors cannot be systematic, because 
rational individuals will form their expectations according to the REH. This means that the 
'classical' neutrality proposition can be maintained in a manner which explicitly takes 
account of expectations.30 Anticipated changes in the money supply will not induce 
changes in real variables, whereas unanticipated monetary changes will merely have trans-
itory effects on these variables. This has important consequences for the effectiveness of 
monetary policy. As Lucas (1972a, pp. 78 - 79, italics in origmal) stated, "[s]ince [the 
agents'] ability to discriminate [between nominal and real disturbances] should not be 
altered by a proportional change in the scale of monetary policy, intuition suggests that 
such scale changes could have no real consequences." Hence, systematic monetary policy 
does not influence real economie activity. Monetary disturbances are merely capable of 
influencing real variables because the economie agents do not have sufficiënt information 
to solve the signal extraction problem adequately. In turn, this means that monetary policy 
can only be successful by 'fooling' people. 
By combining Friedman's NRH, Phelps's 'island parable', and Muth's REH, 
Lucas (1972a) provided an example of an economy in which the existence of a Phillips 
Curve is consistent with the absence of money illusion. His model exhibited the four 
characteristics mentioned in the Introduction, which became integral parts of the modelling 
Standard of New Classical Economics. As De Marchi (1990, p. 33) concluded, Lucas's 
2
 Lucas (1972a, p. 80) formulated this in terms of the following regression hypothesis 
of the Lucas supply function: 
In Yt = p0 + p,(ta P, - In P,_,) + e, 
in which et is a serially independent, zero-mean, random disturbance variable. Lucas 
argued that "[c]ertainly a positive estimate for /?x would ... be interpreted as evidence for 
the existence of a 'trade-off between inflation and real output." However, "... there is no 
such trade-off in the model under study, yet [the estimator of /?J will turn out to be posi-
tive", due to the restricted information sets of the economie agents. 
30
 This proposition holds that monetary disturbances merely lead to changes in 
nominal (and not in real) variables. In this sense money is presumed to be neutral. The 
proposition is often poetically rephrased as 'money is (merely) a veil' (over real economie 
activity). 
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(1972a) paper set the modelling style.31 However, it appears that the content of the REH 
changed in the process of combining these propositions. Muth (1961) had used the 
hypothesis in a partial-equilibrium framework, which implies that in order to fonn (on 
average) optimal expectations, (the aggregate of) individuals must know the structure of 
their local market. This means that they must know how the other market participants will 
act. In a partial-equilibrium context, this implicit assumption may be a plausible one: 'hog 
farmers are likely to know the hog market' (and if they do not, they will go bankrupt). In 
Lucas's (1972a) general equilibrium framework an analogous assumption is presupposed. 
As was shown in section 3, Lucas (1972a) argued that the average of expectations will.only 
be incorrect if on aggregate the individuals do not anticipate a change in the supply of 
money. Otherwise their anticipation will be correct. Ex-post optimality is thus caused only 
by the incompleteness of information about the source of disturbance. Again, just as in 
Muth's analysis, this presupposes that the individuals know (in a probabilistic sense) what 
the state of the system will be. In Lucas's (1972a) general-equilibrium analysis this system 
is the economy as a whole. He thus implicitly assumed that on average the individuals 
know the structure of the economie system as a whole.32 It turns out that Lucas's transpo-
sition of the REH from a partial-equilibrium to a general-equilibrium context has an 
important implication for the assumption about the individuals' information sets. 
The substitution of the REH for the AEH not only changed the content of the 
individuals' information sets, it also invalidated a common econometrie technique of 
evaluating economie policy.33 This invalidation has been called the 'Lucas critique'. 
5. THE LUCAS CRITIQUE 
In 1970 Lucas presented a conference paper which was published in 1972 as 'Econometrie 
Hence, Lucas's paper can be seen as the beginning of the positive and negative heu-
ristic of the New Classical research programme. 
32
 It might be objected that Lucas (1972a) circumvented this strong assumption by 
presupposing (1) that all individuals which belong to the same generation are identical, and 
hence know each others' actions, and/or (2) that there is no communication between 
markets, in which case the behaviour of economie agents on other markets does not 
influence a particular agent's actions. 
33
 Lucas (in Klamer (1985, p. 38)) remarked that in the 1960s he already knew the 
REH. However, he "... didn't understand then how fundamental a difference it made 
econometrically. I didn't realize that if you took it seriously you had to rethink the whole 
question of testing and estimation. I guess no one else did either, except for Muth." 
Sargent (in Klamer (1985, p. 61)) concurred with this view. 
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testing of the Natural Rate Hypothesis' (1972b). In this paper Lucas observed that the 
NRH is chaüenged by observations that a trade-off between changes in the inflation rate 
and changes in the level of real output exists. The question is whether the NRH can only 
be maintained on theoretical (a priori) grounds, or whether there is also some empirical 
justification? Can the NRH be formulated in a testable fonn, and if it can how should the 
test be conducted? 
Lucas (1972b) claimed that the answer to the first part of this question is affirm-
ative. He combined the NRH with the REH, so that there was no a priori reason to presu-
me that the information set will be incomplete and hence that the expectations will be 
incorrect (p. 93).^ This means that the mathematica! mean of the expectational errors is 
zero. According to Lucas, if the REH is combined with the NRH, then "... rational expec-
tations are equivalent to the existence of a natural output rate" (p. 96, italics in original). 
The next step in his paper was to add an aggregate demand schedule to the aggregate 
supply schedule. The former is interpreted as a policy rule, which is defined as "... a 
(possibly randomized) rule giving thé current value of jct as a function of the state of the 
system" (p. 96, italics in original)). Using a more concrete rule, Lucas derived the condition 
for market clearing by equating the aggregate demand schedule with that of aggregate 
supply. He assumed that the system is linear, which leads to the following solution for real 
output (p. 97):^ 
34
 Page numbers refer to the 1981 reprint of Lucas (1972b). 
35
 Lucas (1972b) derived this equation: 
(a) y, = a (P, - Pt') 
(b) Pt' =£(FM |x l,x,.1, r\t) 
(c) yt + Pt = xt 
(d) x, = p ^ i + Pjx,_2 + e, 
where the variables are those as given in the text. Lucas (1972b, p. 97) "conjectures" the 
solution of this system of equations as follows. He combined equations (a) and (c) in order 
to eliminate yv This yields: 
(e) (1 + a)P, - aP; = xt 
Lucas subsequently assumed that the solutions are linear, hence: 
0) P, = ntxt + itjXM + n3i\t 
(g) Ptm = njc, + itjX,., + *4ii, 
Substituting these equations in (e) and (b), this yields six equations in n1 to w6, which can 
be solved in terms of fJv P2> sai^ a- T n e resulting equation is (5.1). 
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,Kn a (1 + a) (1 - P,) - p ^ 2 (5.1) yt = ! 1-—- xt 
( 1 + « ) D + « < 1 - P,)l - Pj«2 
PJÖ 2 
(1 + a) [1 + a (1 - p,)] - Pjfls 
x<-" ( r b ) "• 
where vt is the log of real GNP, xt is the log of nominal GNP, the fi's are the parameters 
in the policy mie, and vt is an independent random error term which is normally distrib-
uted with mean zero and variance o2. Given this version of the NRH, the question can 
now be addressed whether and how models of this type can be tested. Lucas (1972b, p. 99) 
opined that the common methods of testing would take the sum of the coefficients of xx 
and JCj.j as a measure of the long-run effect of a once-and-for-all (permanent) demand 
shift. Suppose that this shift is caused by nominal factors, such as a change in the rate of 
inflation. The NRH then predicts that real GNP will not change, because economie agents 
do not suffer firom money illusion. In terms of equation (5.1), this means that the sum of 
the coefficients of xt and xul must be zero. According to Lucas, this test has been the 
'Standard' test of the NRH. He argued that it would be an inappropriate one in case the 
NRH was combined with the REH, as is readily seen from equation (5.1). The coefficients 
of xt and xt^ contain the policy parameters /9j and /?2> which means that a change in 
monetary policy will alter the coefficients. Presumably this will change their sum, which in 
that case does not remain zero. This means that the new policy "... cannot be evaluated by 
simply summing parameters implied by some previous, now irrelevant policy" (p. 99). 
Stated less formally, in a economie system in which economie agents form their expec-
tations according to the REH, an anticipated change in monetary policy will immediately 
be incorporated in the (rational) expectations. This means that the agents will adapt their 
actions accordingly, thus changing the parameters of the behaviourial equations (and hence 
the structure of the economy). Any method of testing the joint NR/RE hypothesis which 
takes the parameters in the model as invariable is invalid because of the so-called 'cross-
equational restrictions'. Lucas (1981a, p. 9) concluded that "[i]f the theory of 'Expectations 
and the Neutrality of Money was the correct way to formulate the Friedman-Phelps 
natural-rate hypothesis, then it was evident that the econometrie methods then being 
applied to test this hypothesis were entirely missing the point." This criticism of the econo-
metric method under consideration has become known as the Lucas critique. Lucas 
36
 The Lucas critique can be interpreted as 'merel/ an example of Goodhart's Law, 
which in its broadest sense holds that 'social laws' are subject to change if one attempts to 
exploit them. Lucas (1981a, p. 10) observed that Sargent (1971) had already achieved the 
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(1972b, pp. 99 - 100) subsequently outlined an alternative test procedure which estimated 
the parameters in equation (5.1) and then used the estimates for estimating e.37 
Sargent (1971) also invalidated a common method of testing the NRH (or as he 
called it the 'accelerationist' thesis of Phelps and Friedman). Empirical tests of the NRH 
had assumed that economie agents form their price expectations adaptively. The price 
expectation then is a weighed average of past relative changes in the general price 
level.38 Substitution of this price-expectation function into a Phillips-curve relationship 
yields the following equation (p. 33):39 
Aw, " AP, . 
(5-2) :-* = « £ v , . -^ + / (^ . . . ) + e , 
where wt is the nominal wage rate in period t, Pt is the general price level in /, Ut is the 
unemployment rate in that period, f(Ut, ...) is the short-run Phillips curve with di/8U < 0 
and with the sequence of dots representing a list of other variables, and et is an unobser-
objective of making clear that 'orthodox' distributed-lag tests could not be used to test the 
NRH (the so-called 'Lucas critique'). He added that he himself"... did not know this at the 
time ...." This suggests that Lucas's 1972 paper was written at a later date than Sargent 
(1971). The problem, however, is that Lucas's paper was already presented at a conference 
in October 1970. This means that he could not have known Sargent's paper, unless the 
latter had been written at an earlier date. From a chronological point of view, the question 
then is whether Sargent wrote his 'A note on the "accelerationist" controversy' already in 
1970 (or at an even earlier date)? It appears that Lucas and Sargent have discovered the 
'Lucas critique' simultaneously, independently, and along different Unes. In any case, its 
discovery had taken place well before Lucas's second paper on the issue, entitled 
'Econometrie policy evaluation: a critique' (1976), which is usually referred to as the paper 
in which he outlined his critique. 
37
 Lucas's model contained four slope parameters, but the number of independent 
parameters is only three (namely a, fa, and fa). Lucas proposed first to estimate fa and 
fa. He then assumed these estimates to be true values. This means that equation (5.1) is 
nonlinear in the still unknown parameter a. He concluded that "[a] Standard Chi-square 
test, using a comparison of the sum of squared errors from Equation 19 [i.e. (5.1)] esti-
mated with and without this restriction, can then be used to evaluate the hypothesis" (p. 
99). 
38
 Sargent (1971, p. 33) formulated the AEH as föllows: 
" AP , 
i-o rt-i-\ 
where the Vj's are positive parameters. 
39
 Page numbers refer to the reprint of Sargent (1971) in Lucas and Sargent (1981). 
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vable random variable. The first argument on the right-hand side of the equation is the 
public's expectation about inflation in t. The parameters v; and a are subject to the 
following restrictions: V; > 0 and 0 < a ^ 1. The NRH is supposed to be corroborated if a 
is close to unity, whereas it is considered to be discorroborated if it is closer to zero. 
Estimation of the (m+2) parameters is possible only if some restriction is added.41 Sargent 
observed that "[a]lmost always, the constraint that has been imposed is that the distributed 
lags in [the AEH] sum to unity" (p. 34). In his view, this constraint is usually justified by 
the argument that eventually economie agents will fully incorporate an unexpected change 
in the rate of inflation into their price-expectations. Under the AEH this will only hold if 
the new inflation rate remains unaltered for quite some time. Sargent claimed that in 
reality this is never the case.42 Instead, it is "... most appropriate to ask what sort of 
expectations-generating scheme would be reasonable in the light of the actual behavior of 
the rate of inflation during the period being studied" (pp. 34 - 35). Rational economie 
agents will adopt an expectation formation mechanism which minimizes their expectational 
errors. The most reasonable restriction which can be imposed on the sum of the distrib-
uted lags is then the one which is compatible with the observed behaviour of the rate of 
inflation. Sargent (1971, pp. 35 - 36) subsequently showed that the appropriate restriction 
is that this sum is less than unity.43 In turn, this means that the unity-restriction leads to 
overestimation of the Vj's and to underestimation of a. He concluded that "... as usually 
interpreted, those estimates teil us virtually nothing about the validity of the accelerationist 
thesis" (p. 37). 
To summarize, Lucas (1972b) tried to answer two questions. The first question asked 
40
 As Maddock (1979, p. 158n4) observed, "[i]t is quite common in this [i.e. New 
Classical] literature to switch back and forth between income and unemployment by 
replacing log unemployment for log income minus log trend income." 
41
 After all, there are (m+2) parameters (v0, ..., vm, and a) and only (m + 1) degrees of 
freedom. This means that one restriction must be imposed on the Vj's in order to render 
the estimation of the (m+2)-th parameter (a) possible. 
42
 It is interesting to note that Sargent here used an argument which appears to 
amount to the methodological position of descriptive realism, which can be described (not 
defined) as the methodological stance that the assumptions of a theory must describe 
reality as we observe it. But perhaps it is more appropriate to interpret his remarks in 
terms of the notion of 'plausibility', which he was to specify in his (1973b). 
43
 He argued that if the unity-restriction would be appropriate, then the actual rate of 
inflation "... would display extremely strong serial correlation or 'drift'" (p. 36). As this is 
not the case, he concluded that the distributed lags sum to less than unity. 
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whether the combination of the NRH and REH (the NR/RE hypothesis) could be 
formulated in a testable form. The answer proved to be affirmative. The testable form 
turned out to pose a problem for orthodox policy-evaluation techniques. The Lucas 
critique showed that these techniques could not be used for rational-expectations models. 
Sargent (1971) also reached this conclusion, albeit along somewhat different Unes. Both 
argued that changes in policy parameters infiuence behavioural parameters. Individuals will 
take changes in the poücy rule into account by changing their actions. Lucas (1972b, p. 98) 
subsequently asked "[h]ow (if at all) can models of this [NRH/REH] class be tested?" He 
suggested a test procedure which would take the relationship between policy parameters 
and behaviourial parameters into account, but he did not carry out such a test. Instead, his 
1973 attempt to test the NR/RE hypothesis evaded the problems implied by poUcy 
changes. 
6. LUCAS'S PARTIAL TEST OF THE NRH 
Lucas (1973) undertook an attempt to test his version of the NR/RE hypothesis. He 
divided aggregate supply into a normal (secular) and a cyclical component, ynt and ya 
respectively. The former follows a trend which is identical for all markets z. The cycUcal 
component, which consists of deviations from this trend, differs between markets. Contrary 
to Lucas's previous models, the equation describing this component contained deviations in 
lagged income as an explanatory variable. This inclusion was a reply to Rees's (1970) 
criticism that the model of Lucas and Rapping (1969b) could not account for persistence. 
Therefore, Lucas (1973) assumed that expectational errors have a drawn-out effect on 
aggregate output, which accounts for persistence in the economie time series under 
consideration.44 
As he had done in his 1972-models, Lucas (1973) explained the Phillips curves in 
terms of expectational errors as regards the nature of changes in local prices. He assumed 
again that economie agents know all past deviations of aggregate supply from its trend 
value, and all past demand shifts (p. 134) ,45 They can use this information to construct a 
44
 Lucas's (1973) aggregate supply curve was formalized as: 
yjx) = y[P,(z) - E(Pt\It(z))] + Ay^fc) 
where Pt(z) is the actual price in local market z at time t and E(Pt|/t(z)) is the expected 
general price level on information available at f. The condition that | X \ < 0 reflects the 
persistence effect of past expectational errors. 
45
 Page numbers refer to the 1981 reprint of Lucas (1973). 
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'prior' distribution of the general, economy-wide price levei Pt, which was assumed to be 
normal, with mean Pt and variance o2. The deviations of the actual local price Pt(z) from 
Pt are also nonnally distributed with zero mean and variance r2.46 Rational economie 
agents will use all available information in their expectations formation process, hence 
price-expectations will depend on both Pt(z) and Pt. Lucas added a function in which 
changes in aggregate demand (xt) were due to either real (yt) or nomina! (Pt) factors. The 
process which describes the changes in xt consists of two components, namely its mean 8 
and a random disturbance variable ut. The test equation which Lucas subsequently derived 
is (p. 136): 
(61) ya = -«•» + itAx, + Ayc,_, 
where it is a measure of the response of real output to changes in aggregate demand. The 
first term of the right-hand side of tbis equation reflects the influence of the average 
change in xt on deviations of aggregate supply from its trend. As the variable ut is a 
random variable, this average change is also the anticipated change in aggregate demand. 
The second term on the right-hand side of (6.1) gives the actual change in aggregate 
demand, with the same parameter but with opposite sign. The equation thus implies that 
anticipated changes in xt do not have any effect on the deviation of real output from its 
trend, whereas unanticipated changes in aggregate demand will affect the latter with 
magnitude ir. Lucas (1973, p. 137) conjectured that economie agents wiU be more easily 
surprised if changes in the nominal component of xt are less frequent. Economie policy can 
then more easily 'fooi' people. This means that the 'tradeoff between inflation and output 
is more favourable, and that the Phillips curve is flatter. He thus argued that the variance 
of xt was inversely related to the slope parameter JT. 
Lucas's test over the period 1952 - 1967 concentrated on eighteen countries. Two 
types of nominal income behaviour could be distinguished: Argentina and Paraguay had 
experienced highly volatile and expansive policies, whereas the policies of the remaining 
sixteen countries had been relatively smooth and moderately expansive. It turned out that 
the variances of nominal GNP of the former were at least ten times those of the other 
countries, whereas their it's were smaller (by a factor of ten) than those of the latter. His 
conjecture thus was corroborated, although this result very heavily depended on the two 
extreme cases of Argentina and Paraguay. 
Lucas's (1973) test can be criticized on two accounts. Firstly, as De Marchi 
(1990) pointed out, the test did not contain all the knowledge derived in Lucas's own 
The distributions o and r are assumed to be independent from each other. 
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process of discovery. In particular, Lucas did not consider his own critique on conventional 
econometrie testing, although in his 1972b-article he had already proposed a solution to 
the ensuing problem of testing the NRH. This means that the test was only a 'partial' test 
of the knowledge which was available at the time. However, this is not to say that the 
Lucas's critique did not play any role in Lucas's (1973) test. In fact, the awareness of it 
made clear that the problems which were implicit in testing the joint NR/RE hypothesis 
had to be avoided. Lucas accomplished this by using international data while at the same 
time assuming changes in the policy rules to be absent. This enabled him to study the 
effect of different policy regimes without having to address the Lucas critique. 
A second criticism which may be levelled against the test concerns the fact that 
Lucas included past deviations from the natural rate (of output) as au explanatory variable 
for the persistence in the temporary (i.e. cyclical) component of aggregate supply. Such an 
inclusion was not founded on economie theory and can be considered ad-hoc. 
To conclude, Lucas's test had evaded his own critique on econometrie policy evaluation by 
concentrating on inter-country differences in the slope of their Phillips curves and in the 
vanability of nominal GNP. Furthermore, he used a model in which persistence was only 
explained by including lagged deviations of output from its trend. In contrast, Sargent's 
(1973a) and (1973b) tests took the Lucas critique (or rather Sargent's own version of it) 
into account. Furthermore, he showed that the rate of interest could be incorporated in the 
New Classical framework. Before discussing his tests, a short detour will be made in order 
to outline their 'prehistory\ 
7. SARGENT'S TESTS OF THE NRH 
7.1. Fisher's solution to the Gibson paradox 
Sargent's work in the late 1960s and early 1970s was concerned with the relationship 
between the general price level and the (nominal and real) rate of interest. In his 'Com-
modity price expectations and the interest rate' (1969) he addressed what Keynes (1930 
(1965), pp. 198 - 208) had called the 'Gibson paradox\47 'Classical' theory implied that a 
rise (fall) in the interest rate would produce deflationary (inflationary) pressures because 
of the gap between desired savings and investment, and the ensuing fall (rise) in effective 
47
 In the 1960s this paradox received wide attention. For a list of important articles 
and books, see Sargent (1972, p. 212nl). 
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demand. A.H. Gibson found that the data did not correspond to this pattern. He sho-
wed that in reality the interest rate and the general price level tend to move together. 
Classical theory was therefore confronted with an anomaly. Presumably the best known 
solutions are those of Keynes (1930 (1965)) and Fisher (1930 (1961).49 Sargent (1969) 
concentrated on the latter's suggestion to distinguish between the nominal and the real 
interest rate. In particular, Fisher had stated that in equilibrium the former equals the 
latter plus the rate of inflation (p. 43).50 In his view, causality ran from the rate of infla-
tion to the rates of interest (pp. 36 - 37).51 In a situation of perfect foresight, a change in 
the rate of inflation will be anticipated. In response, rational economie agents will alter 
their actions in such a way as to leave the real rate of interest unaffected. However, Fisher 
observed that economie agents do not have perfect foresight. The ensuing unanticipated 
change in the rate of inflation will not be translated immediately into a change in the 
nominal interest rate. There will be a transition period during which the real rate of inte-
rest will be 'distorted'. Fisher explained this incomplete adjustment by arguing that "... 
between price changes and interest rates a third factor intervenes. This is business, as 
exemplified or measured by the volume of trade. It is influenced by price change and 
influences in turn the rate of interest" (p. 429). Rising prices and lagging remunerations for 
the factors of production cause producers to earn larger profits. This will induce them to 
invest more, thus increasing the demand for credit. In turn, this leads to a rise in the 
48
 In particular, see Gibson (1923). 
49
 Keynes (1930 (1965)) adopted the Wicksellian distinction between the 'natural' (rn) 
and the market rate of interest (rm). His explanation can be stated in six propositions: (1) 
rm is very sticky in comparison to rn. This means that it cannot maintain equilibrium 
between saving (5) and investment (/) (p. 203). (2) rn exhibits long-term movements 
(extending over decades) because of the fact that the annual increase in the capital stock is 
relatively small with respect to this stock (p. 204). (3) If these movements are upward, then 
rm < rn for quite some time. In this case I > S. If rn is fallmg, then I < S (p. 204). (4) If I 
> S, then the price level will fall, and vice versa (see Keynes's 'Fundamental Equations' 
(viii.) and (x.) (p. 138). This phenomenon "... is a slight, long-continued drag in a particular 
direction," and does not cause a credit cycle (p. 204). A fall (rise) in rn thus has two 
effects. Firstly, it eventually induces a fall (rise) in rm. Secondly, and more importantly, it 
will ensure that I < (>) S. In turn, this induces a fall (rise) in the general price level. The 
interest rates and this price level thus move together. Propositions (1) and (2) amount to 
what may be called proposition (2a), which holds that the market rate lags behind the 
natural rate. This view was already held by Wicksell, who considered it to be the cause of 
the business cycle. For a more detailed discussion of Keynes's and other solutions of the 
paradox, see Visser (1980, pp. 151 - 54). 
50
 Page mombers refer to the 1961 reprint of Fisher (1930). 
51
 As will be shown later, Fisher also allowed for the reverse causal relationship. 
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nominal rate of interest (1925, p. 180). For reasons of convenience, this effect will be 
called Fisher's indirect effect.53 
Fisher (1925) and (1930) had also calculated the length of this transition period. 
He said that this adjustment process could be described as a distributed lag function (1925, 
p. 184; 1930 (1961), p. 419). The effects of an unanticipated rise in the rate of inflation are 
presumed to be distributed over the future according to a probability distribution. He 
found that the lag weights of the distributed lag function declined slowly (1930 (1961), p. 
427), and that the transition period was therefore rather long. He estimated that it could 
take ten to thirty years before the effects were fully incorporated in the nominal interest 
rate.54 
7.2. The implausible length of the transition period 
Sargent (1969) interpreted Fisher's distributed lag function as an expectations formation 
mechanism.55 Given the calculated length of the transition period, this interpretation 
implies that it would take ten to thirty years before economie agents correctly anticipate 
the new rate of inflation and act accordingly. Sargent concurred with Cagan (1965, p. 257) 
Fisher (1925, p. 180) called his article "... little more than an inductive verifïcation of 
these established truths in their application to 'the business cycle' ..." 
53
 This effect should not be confused with Wicksell's indirect mechanism, which holds 
that an expansion of the money supply will lead to an increase in the genera! price level, 
via the (market or nominal) rate of interest. This means that causality runs from the 
interest rate to the price level. Fisher's indirect effect relates the rate of inflation (and 
hence the change in the price level) to the nominal rate of interest via effective demand. 
Causality thus runs from (changes in) the price level to the interest rate. Fisher (1930 
(1961), p. 443n21) acknowledged that he was not the first to discover the indirect effect. 
He stated that "Prof. Knut Wicksell was one of the first to recognize the influence of inter-
est rates upon prices. See his book, Geldzins und Güterpreise; Prof. Alfred Marshall, Prof. 
Gustav Cassel, Rt. Hon. Reginald McKenna, Chairman of the Midland Bank of London, 
Mr. R.G. Hawtrey, of the Treasury of Great Britain, and many other well known econom-
ists, bankers, and business men have emphasized that business activity is influenced and 
may be largely controlled by manipulation of the discount rate" (p. 443n21). 
54
 More in particular, "[f]or recent years in Britain, ... the effects of P' [i.e. of changes 
in the general price level] are distributed over 28 years" (p. 438). 
55
 Sargent (1969, p. 132) formulated this mechanism as: 
" P - P 
« . - r , -P , -£"« £ V i ± 1 
i-O ff-i-l 
where w{ > 0 for all i. 
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that this is very implausible. He recalculated the length of the transition period, using an 
equation in which the nominal rate of interest rt is explained in terms of (changes in) 
aggregate output xt, relative changes in the real money supply rot', the rate of inflation pt, 
and a randora disturbance term ut. His estimates of the length of the lags did not differ 
much from those of Fisher, so that he could ascribe the implausibility of Fisher's lags to 
incorrect estimation. Instead, he explained the length of the lags in terms of what he called 
the extrapolative effect, which holds that an increase (decrease) in the general price level 
induces economie agents to expect prices to rise (fall) still further. This hampers the 
adjustment process, thus lengthening the transition period. Additionally he derived another 
result from his estimates. The parameters of the equation which was tested indicated that 
there was also a shorter-term regressive component in the process of expectations forma-
tion. This means that economie agents expected a rise (fall) in the rate of inflation to be 
foliowed by a fall (rise) in this rate. Sargent (1969, p. 138) argued that such expectations 
were rational because of "... the cyclical properties of price movements over the period 
under consideration." 
It appears that Sargent was not satisfied with the results of his 1969-explanation 
of the length of the lags in Fisher's expectations formation mechanism. In his 'Anticipated 
inflation and the nominal rate of interest' (1972) he criticized the mathematical model 
which Fisher had used. He claimed that in his empirical work Fisher had implicitly 
assumed that the anticipated rate of inflation does not affect the real rate of interest, not 
even in the transition period (pp. 212 - 13).56 This assumption can be formalized as: 
(7.1) r, = p, + n, 
(72) p, = a + et 
where rt is the nominal rate of interest, pt is the real rate of interest, ?rt is the anticipated 
rate of inflation, a is a constant, and ct is a stochastic term which is uncorrelated with the 
nominal rate of interest. The second equation implies that a change in the anticipated rate 
56
 It should be noted that Sargent presumably wrote his 1972-article in 1970. As he 
indicated in his (1987, p. 117nl), in 1970 and 1971 he attempted "... to formalize for 
students the relationships among the various hypotheses advanced in Milton Friedman's 
AEA presidential address (1968)." As I am concerned with the sequence in which the 
articles were written, and as there is no reason to the presume that this sequence differs 
from that in which they were published, I shall refer to the year in which they were 
published, although the articles must have been written one or two years earlier. 
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of inflation will affect only the nominal rate of interest, leaving the real rate unchanged. 
Sargent doubted the plausibility of this relationship and tried to establish whether the 
equations given above "... can in general be taken to characterize correctly the relationship 
between anticipated inflation and the nominal rate of interest" (p. 213). In disequilibrium 
(or transition) periods the actual rate of inflation is not fully reflected in the nominal rate 
of interest. This implies that the real rate of interest must also have changed (systematical-
ly), and hence that it cannot be described by equation (7.2). Sargent concluded that the 
above equations should be replaced by one or more other equations in order to avoid the 
implausible explanation of the extremely long lags in terms of the process of expectations 
formation. The question then arises as to the correct way of modelling the relationship 
between the nominal rate of interest and the anticipated rate of inflation. This question 
was addressed in Sargent's Interest rates and prices in the long run' (1973a), in which he 
not only substituted the REH for the AEH, but also tried to show that Friedman's NRH 
and Fisher's solution to the Gibson Paradox are two sides of the same coin.58 
7.3. Muth-rationality as a criterion for plausibility 
Sargent (1973a) started his analysis by performing a test of the length of the transition 
period, based on the equations (7.1) and (7.2). He combined them with the AEH, which 
yielded equation (73): 
m A P 
(7.3) r, - a + Y E * ' — - + e, 
i-o r,.i-i 
where rt is the nominal rate of interest, a is a constant, the sum is the adaptively formed 
expected rate of inflation, and ct is a stochastic term which is uncorrelated with the 
nominal rate of interest. Sargent's estimated this equation for the U.S. in the period 1870-
5
 It should be stressed that at least in his theoretical work Fisher already pointed out 
that the second equation does not hold in the short run, i.e., during the transition period 
(which can be very long, as was already shown). Hence it is misleading to label this 
equation "Fisher's formula" because this suggests that Fisher not only considered it to be 
valid in equilibrium, but also during the transition periods. 
58
 Cf. Sargent (1987, p. 117nl). 
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1940. The resulting estimates of the 'decay parameter' A were close to unity. He 
concluded that "[t]hese estimates corroborate the main outlines of Fisher's findings" (p. 
392). But these findings did not convince him that the lags were really very long. He 
maintained that "[wjhile Fisher's explanation of that [i.e. the Gibson] paradox formally 
'works', the implied lags in forming expectations do seem extraordinarily long." This 
implies that plausibility enters as a criterion for the acceptance (or rejection) of empirical 
results and the underlying propositions. It is interesting to note that in his previous articles 
Sargent had not given any criterion for plausibility. This suggests that his rejection of 
Fisher's empirical estimates rested on a priori beliefs. However, in 1973 he acknowledged 
that "[t]o say that the estimates of the weights obtained by that [i.e. Fisher's adaptive-
expectations formation] procedure are implausible apparently means that they do not 
resemble the weights that really characterize the process by which people seem to form 
expectations about future rates of inflation" (p. 392). Fisher's estimates can only be consi-
dered implausible if superior (extraneous) knowledge about the 'true' expectations 
formation mechanism is available. The problem is how to obtain such knowledge. Accor-
ding to Sargent (1973a), Muth (1961) had provided a source of information about the 
length of the lags by arguing that the forecasts of the economie agents will be identical (in 
a probabilistic sense) to those of statistical and economie theory. Sargent proposed to use 
these rational expectations as a "... yardstick against which we will judge the 'plausibility" of 
the expectations implied by Fisher" (p. 393). This means that he implicitly accepted the 
propositions that the REH adequately describes "the process by which people seem to 
form expectations about future rates of inflation." 
Sargent restricted his attention to the class of autoregressive models which can 
be formulated as:60 
<7-4) P,*i " E vi Pt-i + «M 
i-O 
where/>t (= LPt/Pu{) is the actual rate of inflation in period t, and ut is an independently 
59
 The estimates are derived by a search procedure. As Sargent (1973a, p. 391n5) 
explained, "[o]ur procedure here was first to search over A's ranging from .1 to .9 at steps 
of .1. Having found the value of A, say A0, that, among these nine values of A, delivered the 
smallest residual variance, we then searched again over [A0 - .09, A0 + .09] at steps of .01 
for the A0 associated with the minimum residual variance. This value was taken as our 
estimate of A.M 
60
 The variables in the equations in the remainder of this section are expressed in 
deviations from their respective means. 
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and identically distributed random variable with mean zero and variance CTU (p. 393). The 
rate of inflation consist of two mutually uncorrelated components. The first (>jt) is determi-
nistic, and is predictable "... with zero mean square error given a sufficiënt number of its 
own past values."61 According to Sargent (1973a, p. 394), B[i]t is generally believed that 
economie time series exhibit no important deterministic (i.e. strictly periodic) components 
of variation, so that »?t is in effect zero." The other component (zt) equals the sum of a 
number of independently and identically distributed random variables with zero mean and 
finite variance. In other words, it consists of "white noise'. The rate of inflation pt can then 
be formulated as follows (p. 394): 
(75) Pt = h = H *} UH 
This is the moving-average representation of pv By equating this representation with the 
autoregressive representation (7.4) Sargent derived a formulation of the optimal-forecast 
generating function. He assumed that this function is a low-order process which could be 
formulated as follows: 
(7-6) P, - flt p,_! + ^ P,.2 + bt «,_! + b2 ut.2 + B, 
where ut is a white noise variable and a1, a2, by, and b2 are parameters. By assuming a2 = 
b2 = 0, Sargent narrowed this function down to a first-order ARMA-process. In particular, 
he estimated function (7.7) (p. 398): 
(a. + b.) a{~1 
On the basis of this equation he derived a 99 percent confidence region for the estimates 
of «j and bx for the period 1870 - 1940. This region included the origin, which means that 
ft) 
the hypothesis that the inflation rate behaves like white noise cannot be rejected. More 
generally, if ax = - bx, then the first-order ARMA-process follows a random walk, which 
means that the mean lag cannot be used to assess whether Fisher's estimates are implausi-
61
 This condition as regards the number of past values indicates that Sargent presumed 
that the 'Law of Large Numbers' applies. Cf. section 3. 
62
 In the origin aa = \ = 0. If we substitute these values in the first-order ARMA-
process pt = &! /»t-i + ^l "t-l + " t > t h e n Pt ~ "t-
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ble. Sargent thus had to find another way of assessing Fisher's estimates, which should 
take the confidence regions into account. In order to achieve this he estimated the parame-
ters of Fisher's equation jointly with the parameters of the ARMA-process in pt (p. 400). 
The estimated equation was written as: 
i-i 
C7.8) 0» = °y + Yy £ *' pt.t * X\ + e ,^ t - 1, T 
where j reflects the maturity of the bond. The parameters of (7.8) were jointly estimated 
with those of (7.9) for a given 6 (which is a scalar that determines how much weight is 
placed on the observations on (7.9)): 
0-9) e
 Pul = e p0 + e Yl E i' P,., * e x' ^ * e «,+1 
i=0 
Sargent adopted a value of 6 which made the residuals of both equations nearly 
homoscedastic (p. 401). The joint regressions led to estimates of X and 7 which were both 
lower than those implied by Fisher's analyses. In most cases they did not significantly differ 
from zero. This indicates that the past behaviour of p hardly influences its current value; 
the p-process can then be approximated by a random walk. Sargent (1973a, p. 402, italics 
in original) concluded that "[t]o work, Fisher's equation obviously requires both large 
values of A and significant estimates for 7. Hence the introduction of the observations on 
the p-process [i.e. equation (7.9] has seriously weakened the ability of Fisher's equation to 
explain the 'Gibson pradox', implying that it is difficult both to accept Fisher's explanation 
of the Gibson paradox and to maintain that the extraordinary long lags in expectations 
estimated [by Fisher] are 'rational'." Sargent thus opined that Fisher's expectations forma-
tion mechanism does not yield plausible (in the sense of Muth-rational) expectations, and 
hence his explanation of the Gibson paradox cannot be considered plausible. This raised 
the problem of providing an explanation of the paradox which would be consistent with 
Muth's REH. 
63
 For ax = 4>j the mean lags are given by -^/( l+bj) , and thus depend only on bj. 
The 99 percent confidence region mentioned above also contained parameter values which 
imply very long mean lags. Hence the length of the mean lags do not constitute reliable 
indicators of the plausibüity of Fisher's estimates. 
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7.4. The inclusion of omitted variables 
Sargent (1973a) suggested the following solution to the problem he himself had posed. He 
argued that Fisher had only taken into account a one-way causal relationship between the 
rate of inflation and the nominal rate of interest, with causality running from the former to 
the latter. In this sense the inflation rate appears to be exogenous. Sargent argued that this 
is unduly restrictive, and that it would be more appropriate to transform the interest rate 
into an endogenous variable. He suggested to test Fisher's model for feedback from the 
nominal rate of interest to the rate of inflation. This model can be represented as a special 
case of (7.10): 
(7.10) l-a(L) -KL) 
-c(L) l-d(L) P, 
where a(L), b(L), c(L), and d(L) are one-sided polynomials in the lag operator L, and 
where «t and ct are mutually independent white noises (p. 405). If there is no feedback 
from rt to pt, then c(L) must be zero. Referring to an early version of Sims (1972), Sargent 
argued that this model could be tested by analyzing equation (7.11): 
(7.11) r, = 5tkjPH + v, 
where m^ and m2 are positive parameters, the hi's are the estimated distributed lag 
parameters, and vt is a statistical residual. Adopting the Granger-Sims notion of causality, 
the esstence of a feedback from the nominal interest rate to the rate of inflation means 
that future values of the latter are correlated with current values of the former.64 Hence 
Sargent tested the hypothesis that h-. = 0 for all j < 0. The test results suggested that "... 
an explanation of the interest-inflation relationship that does not permit feedback from 
interest to inflation is probably unduly restrictive" (p. 422) .^ It thus seemed that feedback 
should be allowed for. However, if in equation (7.10) c(L) does not equal zero, then some 
interpretational problems emerge, because "... it will no longer be 'rationa!' to form 
64
 Granger-Sims 'causality5 merely reflects correlation instead of (philosophical) 
causation. Hence it can give no more than an indication of causation. 
65
 Sargent (1973a, pp. 425 - 26) acknowledged that Fisher had argued that causality 
need not always run from the rate of inflation to the interest rate, but that the reverse 
influence may also occur. In fact, Fisher (1930 (1961), p. 443n21) had argued that this 
influence was already discovered by many others. 
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expectations of inflation by looking at current and lagged rates of inflation alone, since 
current and past rates of interest are of some help in predicting subsequent rates of infla-
tion" (p. 427). Therefore, Sargent proposed another interpretation of his test results. This 
interpretation holds that what appears to be feedback from interest to inflation is caused 
by some omitted variables which influence both r and/? (p. 427). Sargent subsequently built 
a model in which the variable 'aggregate demand' (represented by 'changes in the money 
suppl/) was included, and in which both the interest rate and the rate of inflation were 
endogenous. 
Sargent's (1973a) model described a closed economy with one good which.was 
produced according to a linearly homogeneous production function in both labour and 
capital. The nominal rate of interest r and the rate of inflation p are mutually determined. 
Sargent generated artificial (annual) data which indicated that the nominal rate of interest 
r moved in the same direction as the rate of inflation p. That is, the generated data were 
characterized by the Gibson paradox. The values of the regression coefficients of r on 
future and past values of p were similar to the estimates which Sargent had derived from 
historica! data.66 However, the anticipated rate of inflation n was assumed to be constant 
(pp. 438 - 39). This means that the long mean lags which characterize the relationship 
between the nominal rate of interest and the rate of inflation cannot be explained in terms 
of long lags in the process of expectations adjustment. Additionally, the assumption makes 
clear that Sargent was more interested in the 'long-run' relationship between the nominal 
rate of interest and the rate of inflation than in the adjustment process.67 His simulations 
indicated that the Gibson paradox need not be explained in terms of lags in the agents' 
expectations formation mechanism. He conjectured instead that "[t]he key reason that the 
Gibson paradox may infest the data generated by the model is the failure of wages and 
prices to adjust sufficiently quickly to keep output always at its full-employment level" (p. 
442). In his view, "... it does not seem necessary to stress differences between nominal and 
real rates of return in order to explain the Gibson paradox" (p. 442). This conclusion 
implies that real rates of return (or interest) would behave similar to nominal rates. Stated 
66
 There was only one exception, namely the coëfficiënt on the current value of p, 
which in the simulations proved to have become larger. 
67
 When showing the way in which his model works, Sargent (1973a, p. 435) had noted 
that "[ajssuming that the system is dynamically stable, the final resting place for all 
variables will be the same as if TT had remained at its steady-state value throughout the 
adjustment process; but the path to steady-state equilibrium may be much different." The 
assumption that ir remains unchanged thus means that the path to the final resting place is 
not considered to be relevant. In turn, this implies that Sargent was only interested in the 
'final resting place' of his model. 
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in Lakatosian terms, Sargent's 1973a-article predicted a novel fact, and hence can be 
considered theoretically progressive. To determine whether the prediction was empirically 
progressive (i.e., whether 'reality' corroborated the prediction), Sargent regressed two 
measures of the real return on equities on wholesale commodity price inflation for the 
period 1871 - 1929 (pp. 444 - 45). His results corroborated his prediction that movements 
in the anticipated rate of inflation cannot explain the relationship between the nominal rate 
of interest and the actual rate of inflation (that is, the Gibson paradox). He concluded that 
the explanation of this paradox should focus on the relationship between movements in 
real rates of return and the price level. However, this relationship is somewhat problemati-
cal, because it relates a real variable with a nominal variable. This implies that rational 
economie agents suffer from money illusion. This is a similar problem to the one Lucas 
had faced concerning the Phillips curve. He had shown that this implication may only be 
apparent, by explaining the curve as a result of expectational errors. His interpretation of 
the insufficiënt wage and price adjustments as a consequence of incomplete knowledge and 
incomplete foresight also proved useful for Sargent in his attempt to explain the Gibson 
paradox. This paradox was also interpreted as a short-run phenomenon which arises 
because of the fact that economie agents make expectational errors. In the long run, 
Sargent (1987, p. 117nl) argued, Friedman's NRH and Fisher's two-equations model are 
two sides of the same coin. 
7.5. Sargent's (1973b) tests 
It is interesting to note that Sargent (1969), (1972) and (1973a) did not refer to Lucas's 
work. This indicates that the latter's formalization of the NR/RE hypothesis did not exert 
any influence on Sargent's pre-1973 work.69 Sargent's 'Rational expectations, the real rate 
The substitution of the AEH by the REH played an important role in this regard. 
As Sargent (1987, p. 117nl) observed, "[wjhile working with adaptive expectations ... one 
obtains only weak or 'long-run' versions of Friedman's hypotheses. Switching to rational 
expectations (or 'perfect foresight') leads to much more precise and more immediate 
versions of Friedman's hypotheses. This led Neil Wallace and me to produce Sargent and 
Wallace (1975) and Sargent (1973b)." 
69
 This also becomes clear from Klamer's (1985) respective discussions with Lucas, 
Rapping and Sargent. Lucas argued that Sargent and he "... didn't talk very much during 
the two years he [Sargent] was there" (p. 33). Rapping confirmed that Sargent "... did not 
pay much attention to what Bob [Lucas] and I were doing. He did not talk with Lucas 
much" (p. 225). Sargent himself stated when e met Lucas at Carnegie-Mellon, he didn't 
know what Lucas was up to, and he didn't completely understand his work. In fact, he "... 
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of interest, and the natural rate of unemployment' (1973b) connected Sargent's work to 
that of Lucas, as "[t]he argument in this paper is heavily dependent on the analysis of the 
natural rate hypothesis carried out by Lucas in a series of papers."70 This suggests that as 
late as 1973 Lucas's work had a sudden and substantial impact on Sargent, presumably 
because the latter's work had reached a stage in which Lucas's contributions proved useful. 
Sargent (1973b) started from his 1973a-conclusion that Fisher's 'long-run' 
framework and Friedman's NRH amounted to the same thing. However, the former's tests 
had been inappropriate because they implied that the lengths of the lags in the process of 
expectations adjustment were implausibly long. This raised the question of how the NRH 
could be appropriately tested. Sargent (1973b) attempted to outline the proper ways in 
which such a test could be executed. Additionally, he performed two of such tests. As the 
explanation of the inappropriateness of Fisher's tests was already discussed in Sargent 
(1973a), we shall concentrate on the ways in which he proposed to test the NRH. 
Sargent (1973b) assumed the following equation: 
(7.12) Un, - P(p, - EpfoJ * £ Xpn,^ * «„ p < 0 
where Unt is the unemployment rate (which serves as a reverse index for the natural 
logarithm of real output yt minus a constant Ar), pt is the natural logarithm of the price 
level, Ept is the expected value of pt formed at time M, 6t is the information set at time t, 
A is a parameter, q is the period of relevant lagged variables, and «t is a normally 
distributed random disturbance term. The forecast of this term cannot be improved by 
including components of the information set which is available at the time. This means that 
wt obeys E(Mt|0t_1( « t.j, ut.2, ...) = E(wt|ut.1, «t.2, ...). Sargent (1973b, pp. 175 - 76) 
assumed that ut can be described by the following process: 
(7-13) «, = Y",-i + *«/» lYl < 1 
where £ut is a normally distributed and serially uncorrelated random variable. Using (7.12) 
and (7.13) Sargent derived equation (7.14): 
learned from Lucas mostly by reading his stuff" (p. 60). 
70
 Sargent (1973b (1981), p. 162) thereby referred to Lucas and Rapping (1969a), and 
Lucas (1972a), (1972b), (1973), and (1976). The page numbers of Sargent (1973b) refer to 
the 1981 reprint. 
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(7.14) Un, - (X, *
 Y)tfn,-i + E(*< " Y V i ) ^ " Y W - , - 1 + 
i-2 
+ P ( P , - * r | e M ) - pY(pr., - <$>,_, |e,_2) + ^ 
The expectation of this equation conditional on all past rates of unemployment and all 
other information available at 6t_2 gave the equation from which Sargent derived his tests 
(p. 176): 
(7.15) mjJn,., Unt.q.v 6ft.2 = (A, + yi-^Un,., - y^tt^i " 
where 6it is a subset of the information set 8t. Based on this equation, Sargent proposed 
two tests. The first of these proposals concerned the case in which M, is serially correlated, 
and follows the following nth order process: 
s 
(7.16) » , - E Y J M W + É» 
where f has the same properties as in equation (7.13). If the expectation of (7.15) is taken 
conditional on past values of the rate of unemployment and the subset of information 8hA, 
then equation (7.16) indicates that the lagged error in the price expectations remains. 
Given the fact that ut is lagged n periods, this means that the conditional expectation of 
Unt can be written as: 
a.17) ECUn,\Un,.lt Un,.2 Unt.^, 6^) = 
= EiUnt\Un,.v Un,.2 Unt_H_J 
This equation implies that the forecast of Unt based upon past observations of this 
unemployment rate cannot be improved by including components of the information subset 
9lul. These components will then have coefficients which do not differ significantly from 
zero when they are added to a regression of Unt upon (enough) lagged values of itself. 
This proposition can be tested. Sargent (1973b, p. 176) added that "[t]he higher the order 
of serial correlation in the «'s, the more periods components of 8t must be lagged to 
warrant the implication that their coefficients are zero." 
The second test proposal of Sargent (1973b) concerned the case in which ut is 
not serially correlated, and hence in which the A's are zero. This means that the economie 
agents cannot improve their forecasts by including more information. That is, the expected 
value of Unt formed on any subset 6lul of the full information set 0,^ equals zero. Math-
ematically, this can be formulated as E(t/nt|0,t_j) = 0(pt - Ept|ötU1) + «t = 0. This 
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equation can then be tested empirically by regressing the rate of unemployment upon 
components of the information subset. Sargent in fact performed this test twice. He first 
regressed the rate of unemployment against its own lagged values and a subset 0lt_a which 
consisted of the lagged price level (ptml, pt.2, pt.3 and ptm4) and the lagged nominal wage 
rate (wul, wt.2, wu3 and wM). Testing the null hypothesis that the coeffïcients on these 
lagged variables do not differ significantly from zero, he found that the regression 
corroborated this hypothesis at the 95% confidence level. However, his second regression 
which included a larger subset of 6t led to a quite different conclusion.71 Sargent again 
tested the null hypothesis that the coeffïcients of the components of the enlarged subset 
under consideration have zero coeffïcients, but this time he found that the null hypothesis 
must be rejected at the 99% confidence level. The natural rate hypothesis was thus 
discorroborated. However, Sargent cautioned not to reject the NRH too hastily. 
Sargent (1973b) mentioned four circumstances in which a rejection of the NRH 
would be premature. Firstly, his test had assumed that there is no serial correlation in the 
u's. If in fact such serial correlation exists, then the test is biased towards rejection of the 
null hypothesis. Secondly, he argued that individuals may rationally form expectations on 
the basis of a smaller subset than the one used in the second test. He stated that in that 
case "... the essence of the natural rate hypothesis could stand unrefuted even though tests 
using large subsets 6iul find systematic effects of 8iul on Unv" He thereby referred to the 
first test, which had considered a smaller subset and which did not allow for the rejection 
of the null hypothesis.72 The third defense of the NRH against the fairure of the test to 
corroborate this hypothesis held that the u's may have been correlated with components of 
8lt_v Such a correlation means that the coeffïcients of the components will be biased 
upwards, and hence that the regression will be biased towards rejection of the null 
hypothesis. Finally, Sargent took a position which resembles 'sophisticated falsificationism'. 
This subset included "... values of the logarithm of the money supply (currency plus 
demand deposits), seasonally adjusted (m), the federal and state and local government 
deficit on the national income accounts basis (Def); and the logs of the GNP deflator, 
seasonally adjusted (p), of the implicit deflator for personal consumption expenditures (pc), 
of the average hourly wage rate in manufacturing, seasonally adjusted (wr), of government 
purchases of goods and services (g), of total federal and state and local government 
employment, seasonally adjusted (ng), and of GNP (y). Each of these arguments is 
included lagged one, two, and three periods" (p. 178). 
72
 This second defense may be criticized on the account that it is likely to be inconsist-
ent with the rationality postulate. After all, the subset used in the second test contains vari-
ables such as the GNP deflator and GNP itself. Rational economie agents will presumably 
include these variables in their process of expectations formation because they will be 
relatively easy to gather and to process (i.e. without incurring large costs). 
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He argued that"... it has not been shown that an autoregression for unemployment yields 
ex ante predictions of unemployment inferior to those of a particular structural macro-
econometric model that embodies a particular aggregate supply theory other than the 
natura! rate hypothesis" (pp. 177 - 78). He concluded that there is no way of knowing 
whether such a better alternative theory exists until a so-called 'horse race' is held. The 
second test which Sargent (1973b) performed consisted of such a horse race. 
Sargent's second test involved a comparison of the predictions of equation (7.12) 
with those of the following equation: 
(7-18) Un, = ixtün^ * P(p, - Epfo.J * 
i-i 
* Pd - o)(J5»,|eM - /»M) + «, 
This equation differs from (7.12) as it contains the third term on its right-hand side. This 
term represents the influence of the difference between the price forecast Ept based on 
information available at time M, minus the price at f-1. Equation (7.12) and hence the 
NRH implies that a = 1. In contrast, equation (7.18) shows that"... if a < 1 (a > 1), then 
increases in the systematic part of the rate of inflation decrease (increase) the unemploy-
ment rate, contrary to the natural rate hypothesis" (p. 180). Sargent tested both equations 
for the United States over the period 1952:1 - 1970:4, using quarterly data.73 The 'horse 
race' was thus held between the NRH, on the one hand, and, on the other, the hypothesis 
that the systematic part of the rate of inflation affects the rate of unemployment. The test 
itself pointed in the direction of rejection of the NRH. However, Sargent added that such 
a rejection would not be based on an 'unusuallly' high confïdence level (p. 186). He 
stated that the evidence "... would not be sufficiently compelling to persuade someone to 
abandon a strongly held belief in the natural rate hypothesis" (p. 187). Prior beliefs thus 
play a crucial role in the assessment whether the discorroboration of the null hypothesis 
should lead to its rejection. 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
New Classical Economics arose in the late 1960s and early 1970s from the attempt of 
73
 For a discussion of these problems and the respective ways in which they were 
solved, see Sargent (1973b, pp. 181 - 82). 
74
 This raises the question why an unusual high level is required, and why a usually 
high level does not suffice? 
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economists such as Lucas, Rapping and Sargent to formalize Friedman's (1968) contention 
that the long-run Phillips curve would be vertical. By 1973 its main proponents were 
Robert E. Lucas, Jr., and Thomas J. Sargent, who had succeeded in the formalization. 
Lucas combined Friedman's NRH with Phelps's islands parable. His use of Muth's REH 
enabled him to circumvent the conclusion that rational economie agents can be constantly 
'fooled'. Sargent, on the other hand, had concentrated on what Keynes had called the 
Gibson paradox. He rejected Fisher's analysis because of its implication as regards the 
lengths of the lags in the process of expectations adjustment, and he used Muth's REH as 
a criterion for plausibility. Like Lucas's explanation of the Phillips curve, Sargent's 
explanation of the Gibson paradox ran in terms of insufficiently quick price and wage 
adjustment, due to incomplete knowledge and incomplete foresight. It implicitly used the 
NRH as its framework. 
The introduction of the REH led Lucas and Sargent to criticize Standard 
econometrie methods of policy evaluation. This 'Lucas critique' implied that past tests of 
the combination of the NRH and the REH were invalid. As a corollary, testing of the joint 
NR/RE hypothesis was yet to be undertaken. Lucas's 1973 test used international data in 
such a way as to evade the recommendations based on the critique. In the same year 
Sargent developed another way of testing the NR/RE hypothesis and carried out such a 
test. It indicated that forecasts of the rate of unemployment could be improved by taking a 
number of other variables into account. This meant that economie agents could improve 
their forecasts by using regressions such as carried out in Sargent's (1973b) test. However, 
Sargent did not reject the theory, even though it was discorroborated. He discerned three 
types of reasons why such a rejection would be inappropriately. The first reason implicitly 
built on the Duhem-Quine thesis which holds that a (social) scientist cannot test an 
isolated hypothesis.75 Any discorroboration may then be caused by a 'false' supplementary 
hypothesis. That is, the initial conditions (assumptions) may not hold, or the ceteris-paribus 
clause may be violated. In particular, Sargent observed that the assumption about the 
absence of serial correlation in the disturbance term may not hold. Secondly, Sargent 
75
 Duhem (1954 (1976), p. 8) had argued that "... the physicist [or, more generally, the 
scientist] can never subject an isolated hypothesis to experimental test, but only a whole 
group of hypotheses; when the experiment is in disagreement with his predictions, what he 
learns is that at least one of the hypotheses constituting this group is unacceptable and 
ought to be modified; but the experiment does not designate which one should be 
changed." Quine (1951 (1964)) provided an even stronger thesis. He extended Duhem's 
argument to include the 'laws of logic' and all laws of science. In fact, he claimed that 
"[t]he unit of empirical significance is the whole of science", and not merely a theory (p. 
59). 
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'retreated' to the methodological position of sophisticated falsificationism. This position 
holds that a theory should not be rejected if no better alternative is available.76 Sargent 
(1973b) set up a comparative test ('horse race') and its results indicated that there was no 
such alternative. The third reason involved prior beliefs. It was not used separately but 
rather in conjunction with the other two types of argument. Sargent's second test had 
provided "... some evidence for rejecting the natural rate hypothesis, although not at an 
unusually high confidence level." This indicates that prior beliefs play an important role in 
the New Classical assessment of whether a discorroborated theory (and in particular the 
NRH) should be rejected. In fact, they insulate the theory or hypothesis from rejection by 
demanding discorroboration at 'unusually high' confidence levels. It thus appears that there 
is still some validity in H.G. Johnson's (1971, p. 51) statement that "... the 'testing of 
hypotheses' is frequently merely a euphemism for obtaining plausible numbers to provide 
ceremonial adequacy for a theory chosen and defended on a priori grounds." 
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